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BOOK REVIEW
THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF CH'ING BUREAUCRACY. By Thomas
A. Metzger.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973. Pp. x,
469. $20.00
It is quite usual nowadays to find scholars in almost any field of law
making use of sociological, economic, historical, psychological, and
other material to aid their legal analysis.' It is often felt that law can
be understood only if it is placed in its social or intellectual context.
Even the strongest proponents of such an approach would admit, how-'
ever, that it is possible to be a very effective lawyer and still to ignore
such matters, at least in many areas of law. And I should doubt if there
are very many law professors, to say nothing of lawyers, who do not
at times find it necessary to deal with their discipline in isolation-to
ask whether or not the case came up on a directed verdict, or whether
the holder of a negotiable instrument sent proper notice of dishonor
after proper presentment. They might even engage in that old game
of distinguishing "holding" from "dictum."
This is not the case with Chinese law. It is not possible to study
Chinese law without studying Chinese administrative practice, and one
cannot go far in any study of the bureaucracy without running into is-
sues or actions that we would characterize as "legal." Hence any study
which is useful for the study of the bureaucracy is also useful for the
study of law. This is certainly true of Professor Metzger's book.
Before going into the book itself, however, it may be well to give some
rough idea of the condition of Chinese legal studies at the present time,
so that it can be seen where Professor Metzger's discoveries fit.
* Assistant Professor of History, University of California-San Diego.
1. Citations for such a proposition are doubtless otiose, but I have in mind such
works as M. RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE, STABILITY, DIVORCE AND TH_ LAw (1972) (use of
sociological data in a comparative treatment of divorce); any one of the five volumes
of the American Bar Foundation, Administration of Criminal Justice Series, e.g., W.
LAFAVE, ARREST (1965) (use of sociological data to study the way the criminal law
system is in fact administered); any of the various studies conducted at the University
of Chicago in its law and behavioral sciences project, e.g., H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL,
THE AMERCAN JURY (1966).
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The primary problem in studying Chinese law has been the existence
of a myth-namely, that the Chinese never really had a legal system.
To the extent that they had one, they supposedly regarded it as an un-
welcome concession to the weakness of the flesh. The scholarly man,
it was said, ought to rule by moral suasion, not force, and law is force.
Hence in the ideal society there would be no law. While it is
unfortunately the case that most societies have on occasion felt it neces-
sary to have some sort of law, law is something to be minimized. It
is certainly not to be studied.2 Consequently there is no tradition of
2. See D. BODDE & C. MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA 16-29 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as BODDE & MORRIS]. The traditional view of Chinese attitudes towards law is
probably best treated there. This notion is still widespread. A recently published bibli-
ography of English language works on Chinese law begins with the following quotation:
'The ruling principle of order in the traditional Chinese realm was the Sino-
centric ideology of the Heavenly Mandate, and this was administered not
through impersonal laws, legislatures, federal devices, and judicial systems, but
through the mechanisms of family ethics and social ritual, on the one hand,
and an elaborate administrative bureaucracy on the other. The first carried
the full authority of the Confucian school, the second that of the Legalists.
All meanings carried by 'law' in pre-Maost China derived from the operation
and interaction of these two sets of principles. Thus, it was only when social
order could not be maintained by reliance on the separate codes of behavior
which inhered in each of the classical five relationships that administrative
'law' was invoked, and it operated vertically from state upon subject rather
than horizontally and directly between individuals. Furthermore, and as clas-
sical Chinese literature makes abundantly clear, law was so overwhelmingly
penal in emphasis as to become tantamount to punishment. Indeed, govern-
ments held fast to the view that one must punish severely so that one will not
have to punish again. Contractual law had no place either in the Legalist or
the Confucian system, for the latter's stress on rigid gradations in family and
class relations made inequality the basic norm. Within this social milieu, con-
sensus and conciliation were assiduously sought, but autonomous individual in-
tentions-the prerequisite for contract-could not emerge. And the same
holds true, by definition, of civil rights and constitutional frames of rules."
Progressive Center for Comparative Legal Research, University of Illinois Law Library,
New Titles in Foreign and International Law, Jan. 21, 1974, at 1, quoting from Boze-
man, Law, Culture and Foreign Policy: East Versus West, 1 ASIAN AFFAIRS 106, 114-
1-5 -(1973). See also Ma, Law and Morality: Some Reflections on the Chinese Exper-
ience Past and Present, 21 PiL. E. & W. 443 (1971). Almost every westerner who
does research into Chinese law has had the maddening experience of being informed
of the superiority of Chinese civilization to western because the Chinese did not use
law to settle disputes. At any rate I have. See also J. COHEN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS
IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 4 (1968). Indeed, one need not be very interested
in law to hear such statements. At least, that is the way I interpret the remarks of
the "philosopher" to Somerset Maugham that are reported in S. MAUGHAM, ON A
CHINESE SCRE.EN, in THE TRAVEL BooKS 91-97 (1955). It has also been suggested, how-
ever, by one of the most prominent sinologists, that the Chinese government was con-
sistently repressive and authoritarian from a very early period and used Confucianism
as a useful prop for totalitarianism. See E. BALAZS, CHINESE CIVILIZATION AND BUREAU-
cRAcY 17-19 (1964).
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the study of Chinese law which western scholars can use,' and in effect,
there is a sort of covering up of the system (at least as westerners inter-
pret the evidence).
In fact, the Chinese had a highly elaborate, formal legal system,
which played a central role in their lives. It was widely known and
much used. Its heart was a code, called in Ch'ing times the Great
Ch'ing Code.4 It was, however, a system that was very different from
anything that we recognize as law, and we do not really have the con-
ceptual tools to study it. If there was any tradition of legal study, it
died out with the revolution of 1911. All modern Chinese legal scholars
are western trained, as are the Japanese; so they are no help.5 Perhaps
as a result of this, little work on traditional Chinese law had been done
in the West until recently. With the development of interest in China,
there has also been a development of an interest in Chinese law. This
interest became well established with the publication in 1967 of Pro-
fessors Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris' Law in Imperial China. This
book constitutes, in effect, a summary of what was known and believed
about Chinese law by Chinese and westerners up to that time. It in-
cludes an excellent bibliography and discussion of sources. It is, there-
fore, both a good statement of existing doctrine which subsequent
3. Officially at least, there were no lawyers, in the sense of either advocates or
solicitors or notaries. See BODDE & MORRIS 4-5. See also S. VAN DER SPRENKEL, LEGAL
INsTrruTIONS IN MANcHI CHINA 69 (1962) [hereinafter cited as VAN DER SPREN EL].
See also J. WATr, THE DisTicr MAGISTRATE IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA 24-25, 219-20
(1972) (content of the bureaucracy entrance examinations). A leading Ch'ing official
Hs~ieh Yiin-sheng, complained of magistrates' lack of legal knowledge. 1 Hs'iEH
YUN-SHENG, TU-LI TSUN-I (REsERVATiONS ON READING THE LI) 80-81 (Huang Tsing-chia
ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as HSOEHI.
4. See text accompanying note 29 infra. The fact that there was usually a part
of the dynastic history devoted to the Code would seem to indicate its importance.
BODDE & MORRIS 52-53. For a subsequent translation of portions of the Ming legal his-
tory, see F. MTNZEL, STRAFRECHT IM ALTEN CHINA 34-75 (1968). Portions of the Code
were apparently included in the semi-monthly inspirational readings that magistrates
gave, or were supposed to give, to the people. HsiAo KUNG-CHUAN, RURAL CHINA 190
(1960). Even more telling, to me, is the existence of a centuries-old tradition of detec-
tive stories, all of which center around a trial under the Code. The best known in the
West is perhaps DEE GOONG AN, THREE MURDERS SOLVED BY JUDGE DEE (R. van Gulik,
transl. & ed. 1949), but there were many more. See C, HsiA, THE CLASSIC CHINESE
NOVEL 25-26 (1968) for a discussion of the genre.
5. The modem Chinese Code, still in force in Taiwan, is modelled on the Japanese
Code, which is in turn modelled on an early draft of the German BGB. See J. ESCARRA,
LE DRorr CHINois 241 (G. Browne transl. 1961);- Takaganagi, A Century of Innova-
tion: The Development of Japanese Law 1868-1961, in LAw IN JAPAN 30-31 (A. von
Mehren ed. 1963).
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scholars can shoot at, and, at the same time, an armory of weapons for
carrying on such an attack. It is an enormously useful book.
Professor Bodde8 noted that the reason little had been written about
Chinese law was no doubt "the fact that the written law of pre-modern
China was overwhelmingly penal in emphasis, that it was limited in
scope to being primarily a legal codification of ethical norms long domi-
nant in Chinese society, and that it was nevertheless rarely invoked to
uphold these norms except when other less punitive measures had
failed."' The law was not concerned with civil or private suits. More-
over, it was administered in a vertical way. Citizen did not sue citizen.
Complaints were filed with the magistrate, who decided whether or not
to act (and who could also act as complainant), and review was within
the bureaucracy. The magistrate had no specialized legal training and
was the representative of the crown, as it were, in the district or county.
He performed all the necessary governmental functions, from keeping
the public works in repair to deciding lawsuits. There were no
lawyers to represent private parties. What we would regard as the
heart of a legal system-torts, contracts, property-was regulated not
by law but by custom, and disputes were settled in some private man-
ner, notably mediation by a village elder.8
This is -the picture that subsequent legal historians are seeking to
tear to shreds,' and Professor Metzger is one of the attackers.10 It
6. Professor Bodde wrote most of the material dealing with China. Professor
Morris wrote principally the legal analysis of the Chinese material. BODDE & MORRIS
vii-viii.
7. Id. at 3.
8. Id. at 5-6. See also VAN DER SPRENKEL 80-111; Cohen, Meditation on the Eve
of Modernization, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1201 (1966).
9. Perhaps I exaggerate. It is my belief that Professor Metzger's book casts con-
siderable doubt on the conclusions of Bodde and Morris. For one thing, he indicates
that many "law-jobs" were decided neither by custom nor by the Code, but by other
bodies of regulations. T. METZGER, THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF CH'ING Bu-
REAucRAcY 235-417 (1973) [hereinafter cited as METZGER]. He also casts doubt on
the non-existence of a legally trained elite. Id. 150-56. In general he opens up the
field. I am sure that Professor Metzger does not regard himself as one who is attacking
Bodde and Morris. That, nevertheless, is the effect of his book in my eyes,
One of the, reviews of Bodde & Morris was somewhat critical in a revisionist way.
See Chen, Book Review, 29 HIv. J. AsrTic STUDiEs 274 (1969). My guess is that
when the dust has settled, Bodde & Morris will be recognized as being not a book on
Chinese law in general, but rather as an immensely learned and marvelously useful guide
to the study of the Ch'ing Code. As such it will unquestionably continue to be used
for many years.
10. Unfortunately, although Professor Metzger has written what is, in fact, quite a
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Vol. 1974:517] INTERNAL ORGANIZATION
must be emphasized that this process of attacking existing theory-this
dialectical or cannibalistic process-is the way history develops in our
post-Rankean age. It was essential to have existing knowledge
cogently brought together and analyzed before any further progress
could be made. It will doubtless be the case that much of what
Professor Bodde wrote will be reinstated in a later stage of the
revisionist or postrevisionist process. Certainly no one will exceed
him in his knowledge of the sources with which he deals. The problem
is that there are other sources and other points of view, and these are
now being developed. Revisionism is in full flower. 1
One of the difficulties arises from the fact that Professor Bodde is
a great sinologist, but he is not a lawyer. He consequently had to rely
on lawyers-western-trained since there are no others-for his infor-
mation about law. These legal scholars, on the other hand, were not
radical book, calling into question many of the cherished beliefs of traditional scholar-
ship, he has felt it necessary to decorate his work with the usual trappings of this schol-
arship, and has thus weakened the impact of this work. He constantly refers to the
influence of "Confucianism" on the actions of the Ch'ing officials, and seems to find
some basis in Confucian theory to explain their innovativeness and flexibility. E.g.
METZGER 28-34, 63-78. This is in the grand tradition of western scholarship about
China, but it is surely a curious tradition for modern historians. No one would question
that educated Chinese had read and memorized a great deal of Confucianist literature.
It would certainly occasion no surprise if it could be shown that they typically responded
to abstract questions about government with appropriate quotations about government
from The Classics. (Such references are notably absent from legal documents, it might
be noted.)
But does that mean that there was a direct causal relation between doctrine and ac-
tion? John D. Rockefeller was a devout Baptist during his entire life and was, presum-
ably, well acquainted with the Gospels. Does an acquaintance with the Sermon on the
Mount take one very far in an understanding of the development of Standard Oil?
Eighteenth century Englishmen of the upper and gentry classes who had political am-
bitions were, of necessity, members of the Church of England, and there is every reason
to believe that their adherence to that church was more than nominal in most instances.
But it was not to the content of family prayers, or even well-known sermons, that Sir
Lewis Namier devoted his attention-in such works as England in the Age of the
American Revolution (1930)-in his efforts to explain the political behavior of the
English group equivalent to the Ch'ing officials. Surely it is time to forget Confucius
for a while and simply to try to find out what, in an objective sense, was going on.
It seems to me that Professor Metzger's book is in fact a testimonial to his effort to
follow, and tell it, the way it was (if one can so translate "wie es eigentlich gewesen").
One wishes he would make his adherence to this doctrine more overt.
1I. This is true in many areas of Chinese history. In the field of western economic
exploitation in the 19th century, we have apparently arrived at a post- or counter-re-
visionist period. See Lubot, The Revisionist Perspective on Modern Chinese History,
33 J. AsuiN STunias 93, 95-96 (1973).
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sinologists. 12 All had their notions of law formed in the western-that
is to say, Roman-mould. The center of their universe was the private
lawsuit and the substantive rules that are used to decide it-in other
words, the sort of law about which Gaius wrote.' "Penal" law is some-
thing off to the side, although admitted to exist. The internal operation
of a bureaucracy is not something with which the law normally concerns
itself.14
In China, on the other hand, the bureaucracy had been the center
of society for centuries, perhaps millennia.'5  Government had been
highly centralized for that long, and the emperor enforced his will, or
governed, by means of an hierarchical bureaucracy which, by the time
of the Ch'ing (1644-911), was selected primarily by competitive exami-
nation (at least in theory).' All learned men, all students, either were
in the bureaucracy or wished to be. There was no area of human life
that was not subject to governmental control if the government had a
mind to exercise that control.' 7  Since this bureaucracy was the
judiciary as well as the military, the board of public works, and the es-
tablished church, it is here that legal study must begin. That is a very
hard thing for western-trained scholars to realize. If one starts from
the center of the bureaucracy (working with the officials, as it were),
then the law begins to take on a very different appearance. Though
we are still nowhere near knowing what appearance it will take,
Professor Metzger's book contains a good deal of information to help
us find out.
It would seem that his ultimate aim is to understand how Chinese
12. For example, Professor Bodde's collaborator, Professor Morris, is primarily
known as a professor of torts and legal philosophy. Perhaps one could classify Professor
Jean Escarra, ,see note 5 supra, as a sinologist, but he was a western-trained lawyer.
13. Gains divided the law into "Persons, Things, Actions"--an organization that
was continued in the Institutes of Justinian. See 1. F. DE ZULUETA, THE INSTTnEs
or GArus ix (1946) (list of topics); 2 id. at 7-9 (1953) (discussion of the organiza-
tion). For a description of the way Gaius' organization passed on into modem Euro-
pean-or anyway German-systems, see G. BOEHMER, ErNFUHRUNG IN DAS BUROERLICHES
RcnT 70 (2d ed. 1965).
14. After all, the term "administrative law" as used in the United States normally
refers to court review of administrative action, not the extent to which actions are taken
and reviewed internally.
15. See E. BA.As, supra note 2, at 13-27.
16. 1. WATt, supra note 3, at 23-32.
17. M TZGR 3. For a variety of sumptuary and similar regulations, see CH'O T'uNa-
TSU, LAw AND SocriTY IN TRmrrONAL CHINA 137-67 (1961).
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(Ch'ing) officials functioned, 8 what factors influenced them in making
the decisions they made, what they managed in fact to accomplish, and
how. He has not made his aims too clear since he is not in any position
to answer questions. As a matter of fact, he is not in any position to
ask many. Rather Professor Metzger seems to be concerned with
searching out the areas in which questions can profitably be asked.
Since, in my opinion, that is precisely what needs to be done in this
part of Chinese studies, I believe that this is a valuable book.
To be sure, Professor Metzger is primarily concerned not with the
adjudicatory function of the government, but rather with its general
manner of operating. 19 He studies the way it collected taxes or
managed the salt monopoly.2" The primary myths he is combatting are
those connected with the administration-why it was so ineffective.
To a considerable degree, however, these ideas have arisen for reasons
related to the problems that face those studying Chinese law. Grossly
oversimplified, the attitudes and notions that he combats result from
an effort to explain why China collapsed in the face of the western
attacks-military, economic, and cultural-of the nineteenth century.
This is connected with the question of why China did not do as well
as Japan in reacting to the western challenge. It is assumed that the
inability of the government to respond to the novel situation of western
intervention was a fault. Such questions are a commonplace among
western historians, but surely they betray our western bias. Are they
questions the Chinese would ask if they were not westernized? Are
they the proper questions? That is, it is assumed that a properly
functioning bureaucracy would have snapped up the superior technol-
ogy and organizational attitudes of the West and turned them on their
creators as the Japanese did.21  But in terms of the harmonious
18. ME ZGER 3-4.
19. He does not, in fact, deal with adjudication as such: that is, the actions of the
District Magistrate in deciding a complaint filed under the Code, or review of such ac-
tions by the Board of Punishments or an intermediate body. His treatment of admin-
istrative discipline does not really concentrate on process.
20. Professor Metzger seems to have done his principal, in-depth research on the
salt monopoly. This is evident from the citation of authorities throughout the book.
See, e.g., METZGER 53-54, 223-29 (salt gazeteers described); id. at 468-69 (index entries
under T'ao Chu, a prominent 19th century official). See also Metzger, The Organiza-
tional Capabilities of the Ch'ing State in the Field of Commerce, in ECONOMIC OROANI-
ZATON im CHImESE SociFTY 9 (W. Willmott ed. 1972).
21. It may be that professional historians of China do not concern themselves over-
much with this problem, but this is the impression I have received from a variety of
Vol. 1974:517] 523
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functioning of Chinese society internally, the primary concern of any
Chinese regime, is it clear that the government was so incompetent?
Or was it doing anything other than following its own internal logic or
cycle, in which a period of decay in the nineteenth century was quite
normal considering the founding of the dynasty in the seventeenth
century and its flowering in the eighteenth?
Be that as it may, it seems to be Professor Metzger's belief that the
administration functioned fairly effectively, or, at the very least, that
the criticisms that are often directed against the regime are contradicted
by a great deal of evidence. The notions he combats are several: that
the Chinese bureaucracy was incapable of adapting to change, being
rigidly tied to past ways of doing things;22 that the officials lacked spe-
cialized expertise;23 that they had no respect for law;24 that the empire
and bureaucracy were held together by terror; 25 and generally, that the
bureaucracy was incapable of fulfilling its purposes or intentions. 2
Beyond these negative findings, Professor Metzger is careful not to
advance a thesis that his data do not support, and hence does not ex-
plicitly advance any thesis.27 Nevertheless, it seems to me that he is
sources, written and other. This is my interpretation of the thrust of even such a sym-
pathetic statement as that in J. FAIRBANK, E. RErSCHAUER & A. CRAIO, EAST AsIA: THE
MODERN TRANSFORMATION 404-07 (1965). To be sure, it would seem to be a matter
of great interest to modem Chinese, including the governors of the People's Republic
of China, but all of these people have been much influenced by western approaches. See
Davies, Year of Asia's Giants, FAR EASTERN ECON. REv., Dec. 31, 1973, at 24, 27-28.
22. METZGER 28-42. See generally id. at 21-91.
23. Id. at 150-56.
24. Id. at 158-60.
25. Id. at 241-46.
26. Id. at 2-3.
27. This is true notwithstanding his frequent efforts to find support in the Ch'ing
materials for what he seems to regard as the hallowed principles of administrative sci-
ence. For example, he seems unwilling to say in ordinary English that one way in
which the bureaucracy was controlled and directed was the use of disciplinary penalties.
Rather he seems to feel that it is necessary to construct a "model of control requirements
hypothetically applicable to any organization." METZGER 236. These requirements are
that the sanctions be regarded as "legitimated, mild, universalistic, rationalistic, and flex-
ible." Id. at 397. There follows a lovely table from which we can learn that the notions
of the "probationary ethic" and "sense of charisma" are "bureaucratically functional,"
whereas "particularism" and "egotism" are "bureaucratically dysfunctional." Id. at 407.
These notions are said to be based on the work of Max Weber together with that of
'Talcott Parsons, Gabriel A. Almond, G. Gingham Powell, Jr., S.N. Eisenstadt, and
Amitai Etzioni." Id. at 4. Unless I am very much mistaken, none of these estimable
scholars knows (or knew) anything about Ch'ing government, even when, as in the case
of Weber and Eisenstadt, they purport (or purported) to.
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quite sympathetic to the bureaucracy and feels that, on the whole, it
did a relatively good job, considering its resources and the problems it
faced.
The first part of Professor Metzger's book consists of a group of fairly
miscellaneous observations on the functioning of the bureaucracy, sub-
sumed under the headings of administrative flexibility,28 communica-
tions,29 and rule making.30 The second half is a rather detailed
description of a compendium of rules governing the disciplining of offi-
cials. 1 Professor Metzger makes a fairly good case for the proposition
that our notions about the bureaucracy are not correct. At any rate,
he has produced considerably more than a scintilla of evidence, even
if he has not quite made a prima facie case. One would hope that
he and others will pursue his lines of investigation, so that before too
long it will be possible to arrive at some hypotheses about how Ch'ing
bureaucrats behaved, and then to await the attack of postrevisionists
as the dialectical process continues. Such discoveries will inevitably be
of immense importance to legal students of Chinese law. But even the
very tentative, ground-clearing activities in which Metzger engages in
his book are of considerable value. To see why, one must go back
to the picture of the Code presented in Law in Imperial China.
The whole point of Professor Metzger's book, to me, is that no one knows anything
about Ch'ing government until he does what Professor Metzger has done and engages
in the terribly difficult and laborious task of wading through the masses of tedious detail
that are recorded about Ch'ing bureaucrats in the documents they left behind, and begins
to piece together a picture of the way they worked. Perhaps even more important, un-
til one begins to acquire a feeling for the way they did things, one will learn nothing.
The researcher must acquire a Spiirsinn for the field-his most important tool. I think
Professor Metzger is acquiring this sense, if he has not already done so, and he must
be one of the few people in the world who is at that stage.
Surely it is the western sociologists, who have built their theories about human society
entirely out of material from western societies or very westernized versions of non-
western sources, who ought to study Professor Metzger; not the other way round. His
work is a large step towards a preliminary understanding of the Ch'ing government, and
once we acquire enough data about that government as well as other aspects of Chinese
life, all existing social theories ought to be examined in its light to see if they still hold.
See notes 71-74 infra. Even something humdrum like a cross-reference table to the
Ch'ing Code or Collected Statutes would take us much farther than the analysis of life at
Ma Bell's in Chester I. Barnard's The Functions of the Executive (1962). See METZG R
at 437.
28. METZGER 21-91.
29. Id. at 95-164.
30. Id. at 167-232.
31. Id. at 235-417.
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In that book the "law" was said to be "penal."32 By "law," Professor
Bodde referred to the Great Ch'ing Code of Laws, a body of rules that
seems even to Professor Metzger to occupy a central position in Ch'ing
law. It is easy to see why it has been labeled penal, since every opera-
tive section has a punishment attached to it. The difficulty with this
terminology, however, is that if we say "penal," we are likely to think
"criminal," and "criminal law" means "law that is distinguished from
civil law." That is very misleading. After all, our "criminal" law de-
veloped out of our civil law whether one looks at Roman or Germanic
law, the principal roots of all European systems.8 3 Or perhaps to put
it another way, in the early periods of our legal system (Roman or Ger-
manic), redress was sought and obtained by the victim of a misdeed
and the state (admittedly a somewhat anachronistic term) did not inter-
vene to exact its own penalty. Such intervention did not take place
until much later. When it did, it was somewhat unusual, differentiated
from ordinary law, and called "criminal."
There seem to be no traces of such a system of private action in
Chinese law-no systems of wergild or anything similar. The earliest
traces of Chinese law that we have (circa 200 B.C.) are collections
of royal decrees. 34  These decrees include punishments for their viola-
tion and are, to that extent, penal, but since they did not arise out of
civil or non-penal rules, there seems to be no point in using such termi-
nology. Rather, the distinguishing feature of the Code in Ch'ing times,
and probably much earlier, is its organization.
The Code consists of seven parts .3  The first is general, indicating
32. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
33. See 2 W. HOLDSWORTEI, A I-IsToRY OF ENGLISH LAW 43-50 (4th ed. 1936); H.
JOLowicz, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW, 321-22 (2d
ed.- 1952); T.- PLUCKNTr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw 421-23 (5th ed.
1956) (English law).
34. Cf. A. HULSEwE, REmNANTS OF HA LAW 26-31, 71-72 (1955).
35. There is an English translation of the entire Code. G. STAUNTON, TA TSINO
LEu LEE (Taiwan reprint 1966) [hereinafter cited as CODE]. Much of the Code is also
included (in French) in P. BouLMAs, MANUEL Du CODE CInNOIS (Taiwan reprint 1966)
and in P. PHILAsTRE, LE CoDE ANNAMrrE (Taiwan reprint 1967). Of these transla-
tions, Staunton is the most convenient to use because it includes all of the Code and
number the sections. The most widely available Chinese text is the Taiwan reprint
of the 1877 edition. The most convenient edition of the text to use is HstEH, supra
note 3. It also numbers the sections and includes all of the substatutes.
Professor Metzger remarks on his gratitude to that "sinological paradise" the Harvard-
Yenching Library. Few would disagree with that appellation, but for those of us who
are far from "Eden's bowers," the Taiwan reprints are the only texts available. Conse-
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how the rules are to be applied in the remaining parts: how to compute
punishments; what dimensions the bamboo rods used in punishments
should have; and what classes of prisoners should receive lighter
punishments. Each of the six remaining parts is given the title of one
of the six Boards that constituted the functional division of the central
government in Peking: Rites, Revenue, Officials, War, Punishments,
Works. The provisions within each part relate, more or less, to the
work of the respective Board.
It is obvious that the Code was seen as an instrument of governing
generally, and not merely as an aspect of "law." It was closely inte-
grated with the general work of the bureaucracy. If one could stop
there, it would be easy for us to understand. Unfortunately, the Code
also includes rules that deal with what seem, to our eyes, to be quite
different matters from administrative regulations. There are the ex-
pected provisions on such matters as the carrying out of imperial sacri-
fices" and failure to obey an imperial order.37  But there are pro-
visions on homicide"8 and theft"9 as well. There are also rules on
usury, 41 marriage, 41 succession, 42 and mortgages,4 3 to name only a few.
None of these matters is treated exhaustively. A reasonable, though
tentative, conclusion (that may well be wrong) would seem to be that
the Code is exclusive as to punishments as therein defined (fines and
demotions would not be "punishments"). That is, whatever is defined
as "punishment" could be inflicted by a magistrate only as therein pro-
vided. 4  But any of what we perceive as society's "law-jobs" -that are
not governed by the Code would be handled in some other way, either
elsewhere in the bureaucracy or outside the formal legal system. Never-
quently, in my opinion, it is best to cite to them, and I have done so here. References
to the CODE are to Staunton. The arrangement of the Code is discussed in BODDE &
Monms 57-63.
36. CODE § 157.
37. Id. § 62.
38. Id. § 282.
39. Id. § 269.
40. Id. § 149.
41. Id. § 101-17.
42. Id. H9 87-88.
43. Id. § 95.
44. Section 1 provides the punishments that can be used by magistrates under the
Code. These are beating with the heavy or light bamboo, exile for a term, permanent
exile, and death. Any other sanction would perhaps not be a punishment (hsing).
This seems to be Professor Metzger's view. METZGER 277.
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theless, it must be reemphasized that the Code is clearly regarded as
having some sort of special position among a large body of rules.
The principal importance of Professor Metzger's work lies at this
point. He has studied materials that are neither custom nor the Code,
and makes it clear that such materials must be used if we are to under-
stand Ch'ing law, even though he does not talk much about law in a
narrow sense. He has examined a large mass of miscellaneous admin-
istrative material, statutes, regulations, and memoirs. Even though,
as indicated, he has not come up with anything that even purports to
be a total explanation of Ch'ing administrative behavior, some of his
observations are of considerable help to those who are trying to under-
stand adjudicatory process, or understand it better than we do now. It
may well be, as a matter of fact, that these observations are more useful
to the legal scholar because Professor Metzger is not a lawyer. He re-
ports on his observations without translating them into the language of
the American or European lawyer.
Thus in the process of discussing sources, Professor Metzger employs
-I assume, unconsciously-certain usages that strike a lawyer as rather
curious. He tends, for instance, not to differentiate between acts by
the officials when they are performing what we would call aotions of
a juridical nature and other acts, such as repairing canals. Thus he
describes all acts of the administration as "cases."4" Obviously, this is
the way the Chinese referred to them. Even more telling is his use
of the term "precedent."' 47 Any administrative act can serve as a
"precedent" for a subsequent act, and it does not seem to matter
whether or not it is "judicial." Indeed, his principal example of the
use of the word arises out of the question of which route one ought
to use to send -troops from Szechwan to Taiwan.*8 In discussing the
45. His principal sources are the collections of statutes and precedents listed in his
table of abbreivations. Id. at vi. To these might be added Tao Chu's Memorials, dis-
cussed in Appendix L Id. at 419-20. But there are many more. Professor Metzger's
research has been monumental. The amount of time that must have been spent in pre-
paring Table I, id. at 334, is mind-boggling. One of Professor Metzger's great assets
is obviously his ability to read the materials with facility. He mentions the straight-
forwardness of bureaucratic language, id. at 105, and clearly that is true enough if one
is referring to the lack of literary allusions and the like. But many Americans, I for
one, and a number of Chinese find it very difficult.
46. Id. at 21.
47. Id. at 185-93.
48, Id, at 192-93,
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matter, an official cited a previous instance when it had been quicker
to go by one route rather than another.
I found this terminology startling and thought-provoking. It leads-
as everything in this book does, for me-to the proposition that law
must be studied as an integral part of the administration. Though cus-
tom, for instance, might deal with the same subject matter-for
example, tenures-as the Code, that is irrelevant to law as seen by the
Chinese.49 The factor in the social situation which we would regard
as determinative of its nature-such as promise, or the transfer of an
interest in land-is not what was determinative or important to the
Chinese. Doubtless they saw land being transferred whether the
transfer was mentioned in the Code or not. But if they were thinking
about "law," then what mattered to them was, if I am correct, whether
or not the particular act was punishable or otherwise the subject of
government regulation. With us just the reverse is true. We look for
"sales" hence "contracts" hence "promises," whenever we see goods
being transferred; and if we find an "enforceable promise," 50 we find,
of course, the law of contracts. Even if it is changed into "Government
Contract Law," it is still modeled to a considerable extent (at least
in its phrasing) on Williston.5' If we open up our study of law beyond
the mere analysis of concepts, then we are likely to find legal systems
in subgroups such as trade associations or schools,52 or we may look
to nonlegal factors influencing decisions. But the center of attention
remains the lawsuit and the private legal relationship--in other words,
Gaius. If we open up the study of Chinese law beyond the Code, it
must be in the direction of governmental acts outside the Code. Legal
49. The Code has no provisions on tenures as such, but it recognizes the existence
of various types of interests-for example, mortgages in § 95 (which deals with the re-
quired formalities for mortgage and fraudulent mortgages, but not with most of the prob-
lems of redemption). Section 92 requires that land of persons of high degree (Staunton
translates as "nobility") that is not exempted from taxation be registered like anyone
else's land, and the bailiff ("tenant or steward" in Staunton) of the land was responsible
for this. There is a good deal of material on the contracts between stewards and land
owners. For a discussion of some tenancy contracts in Fukien, see E. RAwsKI, AGRICUL-
TURAL CHANGE AND THE PEASANT ECONOMY OF SOUTH CHINA 14-26 (1972).
50. That is, after all, the essence of the Restatement definition of a contract. RE-
STATEMENT OF CONTaACTS § 1 (1932).
51. See J. PAUL, UNITED STATES GOvERNMENT CONTRACTS AND SUBCONTRACTS 54
(1964); Note, Adaptation of Private Contract Principles to Government Contracts, 27
IND. L.J. 279 (1952).
52. At any rate, that is what I am likely to find.
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activity is government activity. A realistic jurisprudence of Chinese
law would be a realistic administrative science.
There are, of course, many other observations of interest. One
relates to the "training" of officials. It is generally agreed -that there
Was no legal education in China and that officials had no technical train-
ing of any kind, particularly in law. Rather they resembled those al-
most mythical British civil servants, products of Macaulay's and Tre-
velyan's reforms, who, armed only with a first in Greats, marched forth
to govern the heathen but maintained a sufficient interest in their edu-
cation to make learned little observations on false quantities and the
like in letters to the Times.53 Professor Metzger records two facts that
make one question this picture. In the first place, he points out-what
one knew, of course, but tended to ignore-that there were a large
number of Manchus in the government who had not had much
philosophical or literary training and had not necessarily done well on
,the civil service examinations. 54 Professor Metzger suggests that they
may have had practical experience. At the same time (and increas-
ingly, as time went on), a very large percentage of the officials bought
their positions. 5 This did not mean that they were uneducated, of
course, but it surely did mean that they had failed, or felt a little unsure
of, the exams. What influence did this have on the nature of adjudica-
tion?
At the same time that Professor Metzger points out that some of the
magistrates did not have a good education, he draws attention -to 'the
fact ,that a number of magistrates had considerably more technical train-
ing than one would imagine." Clearly the magistrates at the level of
review normally had-received a great deal of training, though Professor
Metzger does not suggest how much. In other words, jurists would not
be attorneys who represented parties, but rather legally trained officials
53. Leonard Woolf was perhaps exceptional in taking with him to Ceylon a ninety-
volume set of the complete works of Voltaire and a dog as his sufficient materials for
official duties, but he fit the mold. See L. WOOLF, SOWIo 209-12, 218-20 (1960).
54. METZGER 24 n.6. Manchus, however, were apparently much in the minority.
See Cn'u T UNG-TSE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN CHINA UNDER THE Ct'ING 22 (1962)
(Table 5). If Manchus were imperial clansmen, they could enter the bureaucracy by
taking- an easier examination. Ho PINO-i, THE LADDER OF SuccEss IN IMPERIAL CHINA
23 (1962).
55. Ho PiNG-Tr, supra note 54, at 47-50.
56. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
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who decided and reviewed cases. They were by no means all highly
educated philosophers and litterateurs who had done exceedingly well
on an esoteric examination but knew little of the real world. Rather,
some of them had a great deal of very practical training but were not
high-powered intellectuals. Some doubtless fit into both categories.
This leads one at once to the clerks and secretaries. Professor
Metzger does not really consider them. But we know -that some clerks
became officials.Y7  Furthermore, they did acquire some specialized
legal expertise simply from the nature of their work. It would seem
that such persons would have been especially influential on those dis-
trict magistrates who were not very bright or not very industrious. Was
there then, in fact, a legally trained elite that existed under the surface,
as it were? If so, would its members not have been the ones who
formed the law by drafting statutes and regulations inside the govern-
ment, and perhaps pleadings and other documents outside?58
We are very aware of the way in which lawyers and jurists influence
the development of a legal system. But what of lawyers who are all
bureaucrats? What are their attitudes towards law, and how do 'their
attitudes influence the development of the laws? Obviously, they
would not be much concerned with "rights" (though they-could be
bribed to be interested in the welfare of a particular individual), but
they were likely to be much concerned with rules and their observance.
Professor Metzger makes another rather startling point, although he
does not pursue it too far-namely, that the emperor himself was in
some sense subject to the rules that he nominally had made. 9 Profes-
57. One of the best known was Wang Hui-tsu. See METZGER 149. He wrote one
well-known magistrate's handbook that is discussed and translated in part in VAN DER
SP.RENKEL 137-51. One wonders about the status of "Ch'ien Lao-yeh" in I., PRurrr,
supra note 4, at 115. Pruitt states: "They came from an old family of famous lawyers.
No court in China was considered complete without a Ch'ien of Hsiao Hsing."
58. As to the existence of a notariat, as it were, it seems likely that it existed be-
cause of the prohibitions against it. See BODDE & MORRIs 189-90. It seems to me that
there is indirect evidence of such an institution in a story in one of the most popular
collections of Chinese detective stories, the Pao Kung An. In Yao she, K'ou hou (Bite
tongue, grab throat), a servant prosecutes a neighbor for having killed his mistress and
debauched his wife. Though nothing is said about who wrote the complaint, it seems
unlikely that a person in such a humble position could have written such a formal docu-
ment himself, if he could have written at all. Obviously, fiction should be used as a
source only with great care, but I think this is entitled to some weight. It may be that
Yamen (the local government office) clerks wrote complaints.
59. MET'ZER 158-62, 398. See also id. at 84-85 (discussion -of immutability of
the Code).
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sor Metzger does not really venture to suggest what this means. Nor
do I. In part, it must mean that the emperor was a creature of his
law-that is, to be emperor meant to be the apex of a system of rules
or law. These could be changed, but only within limits, unless one
wished and was able to change the whole system-which may have
meant changing -the entire society. Apart from the internal political
problems, there is a problem of imagination. Perhaps the Chinese sim-
ply could not conceive of an emperor who did not fit this pattern, and
those from outside, like the Manchus, could not either.0° It may be
that the Mongols managed a little better for a time, though in the long
run they surely became quite Sinified. 01 We are dealing, in other
words, with a society that has long since disappeared (it being assumed
to have existed at some point). The emperor had nominal power to
issue more laws, but in fact could do so only in a limited way; the
bureaucracy was also skittish about issuing new laws;02 the Law
seems to be an almost self-sustained entity, which can be changed, but
only in accordance with its own internal logic-all this in a society
which was notorious for not observing the rule of law.
The preceding analysis avoids, in a sense, the impossible question.
What was ,the legal system? The law? We cannot even answer the
simple mechanical question: Where is it to be found? As indicated
60. The Manchus began to Sinify their government as they began to make prepara-
tions to conquer China. E. REISCHAUER & J. FAmRBANK, EAST AsIA: THE GREAT TRADi-
TION 350-56 (1960).
61. See I. DAIRDsS, CONQUERORS AND CONFUCIANS 1-2, 31-32, 157 (1973).
62. See, e.g., METZGER 398. It seems to me that Professor Metzger does not suf-
ficiently consider the probability that the bureaucrats in fact drafted most-perhaps
all-rules and legislation. The formula that the emperor is concerned about this and
that, e.g., id. at 319, that upon learning of a breach in canal banks he stated the disaster
resulted "from Our lack of virtue," id., that the emperor was angered and "broadly
ordered," id. at 313, or even that he broke out in a cold sweat, id. at 319, does not
necessarily mean anything more than "Le Roy veult" means at the end of an English
statute. It does seem to be true that the Chinese emperor both ruled and reigned. See,
e.g., id. at 393-94 (procedure for audiences with officials). Still, he could not have
taken the time to consider every minor matter that he had to approve. There is consid-
erable doubt that he even knew which prisoners he was designating for execution in the
elaborate semiannual ceremonies at which he purported to make the decision. BODD
& MoRRrs 139-41. The K'ang hsi emperor, however, claimed to know. 3. SPENCE,
EMPEROR OF CmHNA 32-34 (1974). It seems likely that one could say that almost all
"law," whether rules or decisions in cases, was the product of the bureaucratic process.
Actually, Professor Metzger implies as much, see METZGER 176-80, but I think this point
should be made more explicitly.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss3/8
INTERNAL ORGANIZATION
above, it is usual to speak of the Great Ch'ing Code as the Code. And
apparently it did have some sort of special position among the multitude
of statutes and regulations that existed. But it was also connected with
them. How, it is not clear to me and apparently not to Professor Metz-
ger either. What he does is to point up the problem, or at any rate
those problems that are presently visible. Other horrors will doubtless
emerge. At present, doing research in Ch'ing law is roughly like being
put in a room with copies of the United States Code Annotated, the
Code of Federal Regulations, and the Federal Reporter and told to start
studying American law. There are no texts, no indices, no key
numbers, no Shepard's, and no cross-reference tables. Even the Code
has no numbers on the sections, and cross-references are by a few words
out of the text, as in early English statutes (Quia Emptores) or Papal
Bulls (Rerum Novarum). Professor Metzger is, as far as I know, the
first to point out that the Code's organization has some relevance for
the study of law. 3 Moreover, he has coupled this observation with an-
other: that there are many other sources that must also be used, all
of which are equally unorganized. It is as though he had thrown an
unindexed national reporter system onto the pile.
This is the effect of his emphasis on the importance of the Admin-
istrative Regulations on Discipline, to which he devotes almost half his
book." These regulations consisted of a body of rules that provided
for "punishment of officeholders for light offenses involving govern-
mental affairs by means of impeachment and of economic and status
deprivations."8 5 Some of the rules are included in the Code and some
are not. They apparently do not include the punishments administered
by the Board of Punishments. If an official committed a serious crime,
it was usual to dismiss him from office, and then send him over to the
Board of Punishments to be tried and punished. 66 Professor Metzger
believes that this body of rules forms an intermediate body of rules that
63. See METZGER 96-98 (discussion of clarity); id. at 155-56 (comment on difficulty
of using sources).
64. Id. at 235-417. The principal text he is referring to is apparently the Ch'in-
tling Ch'ung-hsiu Liu-pu Ch'u-fen tse-li (1887). See METZGER 438. There is, I believe,
a reprint of the 1892 edition in Chin-tai Chung-kuo Shih-liao Ts'ung K'an (collected
historical materials of modem China), Chen-lung Shen ed., as vol. 332 (on front cover,
on title page, no. 34).
65. METZGER 235.
66. Id. at 277-78.
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fall somewhere between penal law and administrative law. He would
thus make a tripartite division of. Chinese law.0 7  My feeling is that
the outlines are not so clear. What seems to me to be indicated is the
existence of other groups of rules in addition to the Code that will have
to be considered in arriving at any total picture of Chinese law. Even
in the field of discipline, it seems likely that there were other bodies
of rules-for Manchus and soldiers, for instance. As a matter of fact,
it would appear that there were such disciplinary rules for examiners
as well, administered by the Board of Rites."
The lesson that I have drawn from Professor Metzger's book is that
while it is still profitable to restrict oneself to the Code and its com-
mentaries, since these are very little known and one must start some-
where,69 it must be constantly realized that these are only part of the
bureaucratic legal system. It has long been obvious to anyone
interested in the matter that the Code does not cover all of Chinese
law. It has been assumed that if one wishes to understand the Chinese
legal system (as we understand the concept), there is a large body of
customary law to be studied as well.70 It now seems to me that the
basic division is not between law and custom. Rather, one must make
functional divisions within the structure of bureaucratic rules and de-
cision making. This division might be made between the Code and
other rules, since the Code probably occupies some sort of special posi-
tion. The task is both to understand the Code in its own terms, and
at the same time to discover and study the other bodies of rules that
exist, such as those discussed by Professor Metzger. Eventually one
67. Id. at 169-70 n.3, 207-14,
68. See note 75 infra. Of course it may be that I have simply misunderstood the
reference, and that this matter is covered in the Regulation on Administrative Punish-
ment.
69. That is, it is clear that the Code is going to be important in any study of Ch'ing
law. Since, however, we do not know how to use it on its own terms (how its rules
interrelate, for example), it will obviously be necessary to make extensive and intensive
studies of it, regardless of whatever other materials must also be studied. Even such
basic tools as a cross-reference table are lacking.
70. See BODDE & MORRIS 5-7; VAN DER SPmRENKEL 80-111. The principal sources are
Japanese. See J. FAIRBANK, M. BANNo & S. YAMAMOTO, JAPANESE STUDIES OF MODERN
CH!NA 75-78 (1971). There is a German translation of part of a 1930 Chinese study.
DIE Aa 'ucHm SAMMuNG cmNEsiscHm REcrrrsGnWOHNHErrN (E. Kroker transl. & ed.
1965). These are all fairly old. It seems likely that a great deal of additional relevant
material is still extant both in China and elsewhere, particularly in reference to land
contracts. See note 49 supra.
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might hope to pull it all together into some sort of tentative whole.
Pending that, it seems to me that it would probably be best to keep
customary law entirely separate. Otherwise, one runs the risk of im-
posing western conceptions on the Chinese material. If one looks for
the equivalent of contract law in customs, the Code, and other govern-
ment-promulgated rules, one is likely to miss the whole point of
Chinese law, which is that it is not like ours, but rather regards bureau-
cratic rules and customs as quite separate. In consequence, "contract"
may not be a significant concept."' There are, of course, similarities
between western law and Chinese, as is likely to be the case with social
institutions of any two societies (Christmas is a Potlatch, as it were).
But the first thing to see is the difference. This is where the interest
in Chinese law lies.
If we consider that as of the date of the promulgation of the Code
Civil (1804), China was at least as large in population and area as
western Europe and had a continuous legal history as old or older, 2
we ought to do some re-thinking of our notions of law. For these
notions are totally European. Comparative law, as we normally under-
stand the term, is the comparison of different types of Roman law.73
71. Particularly in view of the fact that much of the production and movement of
goods in China was carried on by government instrumentalities. Thus many taxes were
payable in grain, and the grain was shipped on government barges to Peking to be dis-
tributed to government officials. See Chen Shao-kwan, The System of Taxation in the
Ch'ing Dynasty 1644-1911, 59 COLuM. STUDIES IN HiST. ECON. & PUB. L. 176-83
(1914). There were many government factories. See CODE § 430, which refers to tex-
tiles and weapons.
72. It would seem likely that Chinese population was in excess of 200 million at
this time. See E. REISCAuER & J. FAIRBANK, supra note 60, at 393. It may have even
reached the neighborhood of 300 million. See Ho PiNG-Ti, STUnms ON THE POPULATION
OF CmINA 1368-1958, at 281 (1959). The population of what are essentially the present
European Economic Community countries plus Scandinavia, Spain, Portugal, Austria,
and Switzerland was about 120 million. RAND McNALLY ATLAS OF WORLD HISTORY
193 (R. Palmer ed. 1957). Chinese legal history goes back in extant texts at least to
the T'ang and probably to the Han or before. BODDE & MoRus 55-63. See also
CV0 T'UNG-TsE, supra note 54, at 11-12. Roman law cannot be said to have had a
continuous history in western Europe after the fall of the western empire in the fifth
century.
73. To be sure, Anglo-American law is supposed to be non-Roman. But in some
areas, such as bailments, the borrowings from Rome are overt. In others, notably con-
tract law, the similarities are so striking as to make one certain that English law was
essentially Roman. One might change Maitland's statement to read that the common
law of contracts was developed by the Roman law of contracts seeping through the inter-
stices of the form of action. The similarity of the systems is shown in a remarkable
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This problem of cultural chauvinism is not, to be sure, limited to law.
Not even science is immune. Though it is now acknowledged that
acupuncture and other forms of "folk medicine" have some validity,7 4
western science deems unnecessary a reexamination of its theoretical
underpinnings. Rather the new data can, it is assumed, be assimilated
to accepted views. One is somewhat reminded of the oscillations of
the epicycles which the Ptolemaic astronomers devised to compensate
for observations that did not fit their theory of 'the earth-centered uni-
verse and circular orbits. It seems probable to me that we miss much
of the benefit of studying Chinese and other nonwestern history by
persisting in looking at events as occurring in a Europe-centered world.
Suppose an eighteenth century Chinese encyclopedia had bothered to
comment on European history. Would it be too far-fetched for some-
thing like this to have appeared?
The nations of the eastern Mediterranean present a curious and
rather pathetic history. At various times and places in ancient
times, societies that one could truly call civilized seemed to be devel-
oping. This was especially true in the river valleys of the Nile and
the Tigris-Euphrates. There were outstanding mechanical and civil
engineering achievements, and there could be clearly seen the be-
ginnings of a science of government, but internal upheavals or for-
eign invasions, or both, always resulted in the collapse of society.
One of the principal obstacles to stability was the existence of two
extremely aggressive and primitive barbarian tribes that lived on
the periphery of this area-the Greeks and the Romans. The for-
mer were an especially difficult people. They exhibited immense
talents in some directions, notably mathematics and astronomy, but
seem to have been totally unable to grasp any basic principles of
government, and retained a very primitive political organization.
way by the massive work edited by Professor Rudolph Schlesinger: Formation of Con-
tracts (1968). The book investigates the law of contract formation in a number of Eu-
ropean and European-based systems (including the Anglo-American) by means of a
series of questionnaires, submitted to jurists in various countries, in the form of hypo-
thetical fact situations with questions. The replies were then compiled and systematized
by an international panel of scholars. 1 P. BONAsSIES, G. GORLA, J. LEYSER, W.
LORENZ, I. MACNEIL, K. NEUMAYER, I. SAXSENA, R. SCHLESINGER & W. WAGNER, FOR-
MATION OF CONTRACTS 30-41 (R. Schlesinger ed. 1968). The aim was to begin work on
finding a "common core of legal systems." While there are, of course, differences among
the national reports, the relative ease in synthesizing the answers of all respondents
surely indicates that the systems are essentially the same.
74. See Roberts, A Reptile a Day, FAR EASTERN ECON. RnV., Feb. 4, 1974, at 25.
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They were very quarrelsome and were constantly involved in inter-
nal and external disputes. A leader from one of their tribes en-
gaged in a devastating series of conquests that were disruptive but
offered little permanent order. Soon thereafter, however, the other
tribe, the Romans, began their conquests. They were less gifted in
mathematics than the Greeks, but were exceptionally strong militar-
ily. They conquered the East, but discovered-apparently on their
own, without receiving any information from us-the truth of that
old adage that though you can conquer an empire on horseback,
you cannot rule it from there. They assimilated such notions of
government as had been developed in Egypt and Mesopotamia and
seemed to be on the verge of establishing a true civilization in those
parts. Unfortunately, they were soon overrun by tribes from central
Asia (including some that have been very troubelsome to us)
and their empire came to an end. It has left little lasting trace.
This entire history is perhaps a lesson in the importance of natural
boundaries to the devlopment of civilization.
I would suggest that such a history is no more inaccurate (maybe
less so) than our notions about China and indicates our almost total
failure ever to look at the world with anything except European eyes.
Doubtless it will be impossible for us ever really to put ourselves in
the position of the Chinese in order to look at law-ours and theirs.
Still, if we ever make the effort, it may give us a different perspective.
Consider, for instance, the effect of a new approach to what are, per-
haps, the most common ways of looking at comparative law: considera-
tion of the structure of the legal system and consideration of legal
process. Either way Professor Metzger's book offers promise of
interesting discoveries. To consider structure first, all western legal
systems concentrate on private law.75 All except the Anglo-American
follow generally the analysis of Gaius.7 6 Governmental activity has to
be fitted into this system in some way. In China, the center of atten-
tion quite clearly is not going to be the person-to-person relationships
of European law, but rather the emperor and the central government.
Law consists of directives that formally come from the emperor, but
are actually drafted, interpreted, and enforced by his bureaucracy.
To a certain extent, these directives bind the issuers. The purpose of
law is to help the government of the Empire effectuate its purposes.
75. Consider the American first-year law school curriculum.
76. See notes 15 & 73 supra and accompanying text.
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The divisions of law, then, follow generally the functional divisions of
the government. The development of -the law, however, does not
always follow the plan, and rules get tacked on here and there for var-
ious reasons, so that the ultimate struoture may be quite different from
that of the original Code.77  This result is similar to what happened
in Rome and England in the development of substantive law out of the
forms of action.78  It is not possible at the present time to see just
77. For example, § 76 of the Code required every household and all of its members
to be registered according to status (military, civilian, physician, dancing girl, slave,
etc.), and forbade any change in status, as from military to civilian. The status goes
back to the Ming Code, see 2 HstDnn 233, and was clearly designed to prevent tax eva-
sion. It is the second section in a group of fifteen that deal with the labor tax (as opposed
to the next group, beginning with § 90, that deal with the land tax). The first sub-
statute is also Ming and is related to the principal section since the substatute requires
military personnel who buy civilian land to pay the taxes. The remaining 24 substat-
utes (using the numbering in Hsiieh) are all Ch'ing and deal mostly with various prob-
lems involved in changing registration. But most attention is given in the substatutes
to the problems arising out of the rule thatthree generations must pass after a slave
is freed before his descendants can become officials by examination or purchase (e.g.,
substatute 5). This leads to the problem of whether the children of other unfortunates,
such as those who have engaged in unlawful religious activities, can examine (substat-
ute 23), and extends into a setting out of the penalties for taking an examination in
an improper district as well as for being negligent in administering the examination
(substatute 24). Several of the notes refer to disciplinary proceedings for examination
officials who perform their duties improperly. 2 TA CH'INO Lil LI 853-55 (Taiwan re-
print 1966).
The entire section is usually referred to as a basis for the law of slavery or of status,
not the law of taxation. G. BouLws, MANUEL DU CODE CHINOIS 161-71 (Taiwan re-
print 1966); G. JAMIESON, CHINESE FAMILY AND COMMERCIAL LA-,v 56-61 (1970).
Moreover, the reference to the disciplining of an official of the Board of Rites (the
Board responsible for examinations) is contained in this section, although the section
itself is in the Board of Revenue part of the Code. Yet the regulations on disciplining
officials discussed by Professor Metzger, METZGER 235-417, are under the Board of Of-
ficials. It may be added that all of the cases that are noted under this section in the
Hsing An Hui Lan (Conspectus of Penal Cases), see BODDE & MORRIS 144-56, deal with
the question of who can examine (the problem arising because some ancestor has been
a slave, engaged in a mean occupation, or something of the sort). See 2 HsINo AN Ht
LAN 611-20 (Taiwan ed. 1968).
78. For English law perhaps the best example is assumpsit, which is the form most
contract actions eventually took. Yet it grew out of trespass on the case, in itself a
development of trespass, an action whose original purpose was to protect against vio-
lence. See F. MArrLAND, TiE FoRms OF ACTION AT COMMON LAw 65-69 (1948). A
Roman example might be emancipation-the means by which a son acquired legal ca-
pacity. His father "sold" (mancipated) him three times and thus freed him accord-
ing to a provision in the Twelve Tables, which had not been intended to provide for
easy-freeing but only to. protect against undue severity, Since the statute did not men-
tion daughters or grandchildren, it was decided that they -could be freed by one sale.
H. JoLOwiCZ, supra note 33, at 87.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss3/8
INTERNAL ORGANIZATION
where Professor Metzger's analysis will lead, but if one regards such
regulations as the heart of law, one would not begin legal study with
the person and his rights.
If one turns to legal process, the differences are also striking. We
tend to equate process with adjudication. How are disputes between
individuals settled?79 This is a natural way for us, in view of our his-
tory. But it would seem that in China, the central process is legislative
or rule making. To be sure, we are quite conscious that decisions of
courts have a prospective legislative effect, and judges often make this
explicit. In China, the rule making often arose out of the adjudication
of a particular case, and the Chinese officials were presumably quite
conscious of adjudication. Still, the focus of attention is different.
If this is a correct analysis, or even if it seems to have some plaus-
ibility, then surely Chinese law is so different from ours that its con-
tinued existence over so many centuries ought to force us to reexamine
our notions of what legal systems are all about. It is impossible, and
I would say inadvisable, to say at this point where such an examination
might lead us.80 But it will only be possible to pursue it with the help
79. For American jurists, the starting point is perhaps the famous statement by
Holmes from The Path of the Law, 10 H~Av. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897): "The
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact and nothing more pretentious are what
I mean by the law." Th's attitude is especially notable among the legal realists. Profes-
sor Llewellyn's entire oeuvre was more or less concerned with this matter. But consider
what is perhaps his basic work, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 12 (1951). His work also influ-
ences anthropologists who study law. See M. GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
AMONG THE BAROTSE OF NORTHERN RHODESIA (1955). But see Bohannon, Ethnography
and Comparison in Legal Anthropology, in LAw AND CULTIRE IN SOCmTY 401 (L.
Nader ed. 1969).
80. Our task is somewhat similar to that of the Glossators when faced with the
Corpus Juris. Of course, we are much closer to the living law than they were. The
materials are immeasurably more extensive, and in addition, our attitudes are differenL
We are-one hopes-more critical, more sophisticated in the use of sources. Neverthe-
less, we are faced with a legal system that scarcely anyone alive has worked with, and
we have to try to understand it with very little help. The only hope of understanding
it is to acquire a sens*tivity to the material. And it would seem that this can be devel-
oped only by the kind of arduous slogging through the documents which Professor Metz-
ger has done. It may be that success in this field of research will come about more
as the result of intuitions acquired in this way, than as the result of rational analysis.
Of course, Professor Metzger is not alone. Several recent works by other writers are
also quite useful. See J. WATT, supra note 3; S. Wu, COMMUNICATION AND IMPERIAL
CONTROL IN CHINA: EVOLUTION OF THE PALACE MEMORIAL SYSTEM (1970). An inter-
esting approach is shown in Jonathan Spence's Ts'as Yin and the K'ang Hsi Emperor
(1966), in which an effort is made to see a Ch'ing official as a human being with fam-
ily, tooth-aches, etc. Since the official's grandson wrote what is perhaps China's best-
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of thorough and sensitive work like that of Professor Metzger.
WILLIAM C. JONES*
known novel, The Dream of the Red Chamber (a fictionalized account of his family
history), there were obviously unusual materials for the study. Still one wonders if
some materials, at least, are not available for other officials. The usual Ch'ing docu-
mentary sources are pretty bloodless.
* Professor of Law, Washington University.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss3/8
